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Abstract: South Korea’s ofﬁcial development assistance (ODA) has been increasing rapidly
and will continue to do so. Korea is one of the few countries which have successfully
transitioned from a recipient to a donor. It became a member of DAC (development assistance
committee), OECD in November 2009. Korea’s ODA policy, along with its growth in quantity,
is at a crossroads for the enhancement of its quality. Discussions and debates are going on
regarding the reforms in Korea’s ODA activities, and this paper examines key issues raised. It
ﬁrst reviews the past and present of Korea’s ODA, and identiﬁes major characteristics
including a low ODA/GNI ratio, a high percentage of concessional loans compared to grants,
a high portion of tied aid, regional bias and a relatively large number of recipients. The paper
argues that those characteristics arise from a lack of consensus on some fundamental issues
like the objective of ODA, positioning of Korea’s ODA as an emerging donor and the nature of
aid to North Korea. We also argue that a shift of ODA policy is required to promote reform,
based on a thorough reﬂection on the role of ODA in the alleviation of poverty and promoting
sustainable development in developing countries, rather than serving as an economic tool.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea) became an ofﬁcial member of OECD/DAC
(development assistance committee) on 25th of November 2009.1 This is a meaningful
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review team visited Korea to ﬁnalize details for the preparations.
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event not only for Korea but also for the international development community. For Korea,
it means that it is recognised as an advanced country by the world. For the international aid
communities, it is signiﬁcant because it is the ﬁrst time that a recipient country became a
signiﬁcant donor country in a period of less than a half century.
Korea was until recently one of the biggest non-DAC OECD ‘emerging donors’2 and its
ofﬁcial development assistance (ODA) had been increasing rapidly (Lumsdain and Schopf,
2007; KOICA, 2008a). As the newest member of DAC, Korea has pledged to rapidly
increase its ODA budget from the current ODA/GNI ratio of 0.09–0.25 per cent by 2015.
As an ambitious emerging Asian donor, Korea is eager to charter its own course in meeting
its ODA objectives. At the same time, following its entry into DAC, Korea will be required
to abide by DAC guidelines for aid in its ODA activities. In this context, Korea’s ODA
policy, along with its growth in quantity, is at a crossroad in the enhancement of its quality
and also in crafting a strategy that balances DAC guidelines and Korea’s national object-
ives.3 Discussions and debates are going on among the government, politicians, civil
society groups and academics regarding reforms to Korea’s ODA activities.
This paper examines some issues which arise from ODA reform in Korea. It ﬁrst reviews
the past and present of Korea’s ODA. In doing so, we identify its major characteristics.
These include a low ODA/GNI ratio, a high percentage of concessional loans compared to
grants, a high portion of tied aid, regional bias and a relatively large number of recipients.
The paper argues that these characteristics arise from a lack of consensus on fundamental
issues including the goals of ODA, positioning of Korea’s ODA as an emerging donor and
the nature of aid to North Korea. We also argue that a shift of ODA policy is required to
promote reform, based on a thorough reﬂection not only by the government but also by
other involved parties on the role of ODA in alleviation of poverty and achieving sus-
tainable development in developing countries, as opposed to serving as a lever for the
economic interests of the donor country.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we chronologically review
Korea’s ODA. Major characteristics of Korea’s ODA are identiﬁed in Section 3, while
policy dilemmas are discussed in Section 4. The paper concludes by suggesting three
fundamental considerations which need to be addressed in reﬁning Korea’s ODA policy.
2 FROM RECIPIENT TO DONOR
2.1 Korea as a Recipient
Between 1945 and the early 1990s, Korea received total assistance of 12.8 billion USD
from the international community.4 In the early years immediately after the Korean War
(1950–1953), aid to Korea followed patterns reminiscent of the international political
divide under the Cold War. The Korean Peninsula, which had become divided into the pro-
US South and the pro-communist North along the 38th parallel latitude after theWorldWar
II, became the epicentre of the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet
2The term ‘emerging donors’ may be regarded as ‘non-DAC donors’ in this paper to distinguish from traditional
DAC donors as Manning (2006) points out. See Kragelund (2008) for the classiﬁcation of non-DAC donors.
3Frequent mentions of ODA as an effective means to promote the ‘national brand’ and to gain access to energy and
resources, often called ‘energy diplomacy’, in interviews of high-level government ofﬁcials, have altogether called
for strong criticisms from civil groups or NGOs. See ODA Watch (2009.12.4; 2009.12.31) for details on the
criticism against the national agenda of Korea’s ODA.
4For details, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2008).
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Union. During the period between 1953 and 1961, the Korean economy subsisted on
foreign assistance, especially from the US.Much of this aid was given in the form of grants.
Korea used the foreign aid to curb postwar inﬂation, secure ﬁnancial stability and make
investments in new industrial facilities. Foreign aid contributed to rapid economic growth
at an average annual rate of 4.9 per cent between 1954 and 1960.
After 1957, grants decreased and were increasingly replaced by loans. Until 1980s,
almost half of the loans were allocated to Social Overhead Capital (SOC) in line with the
Second Five-Year Economic Plan and the Heavy and Chemical Industrialization (HCI)
drive of the 1970s. The loans were put into economic restructuring in the 1990s as Korea’s
industrialisation was upgraded. In the meantime, most of the commercial loans ﬂowed into
ﬁelds such as construction, chemical fertiliser, cement, metal and reﬁned oil which the
government strategically selected for economic development. Table 1 gives a 15-year
breakdown of Korea’s ODA inﬂows between 1945 and 1999, which was the ﬁnal year in
which it received ODA.
In 1995, Korea graduated from the World Bank’s lending list and it became a member of
the OECD in 1996. Although Korea did receive an emergency ﬁnancial aid package from
international development banks during the Asian ﬁnancial crisis in 1997, it managed to
overcome the crisis and in 2000 made its way out of the OECD-DAC list of aid recipients.
As such, Korea was ﬁnally able to make a transition from one of the poorest countries in the
1950s to an emerging OECD country by the mid 1990s, and to a G20 member country in
2009. Korea joined the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in November
2009.
2.2 Korea as a Donor
Prior to its entry into DAC in 2009, Korea had emerged as the unrivalled leading donor, in
absolute amounts, among non-DAC OECD countries5 (OECD, 2008a). Korea’s rapid
economic development prompted an eagerness to share its development experiences. As
early as 1977, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea (MOFAT) started
providing assistance to some developing countries in the form of technical cooperation.
Forums of academics and policy makers to transfer Korea’s economic development
experiences to developing countries were also initiated by the Korea Development
Institute.6
Table 1. Summary of ODA granted to Korea from 1945 to 1999 (Unit: Million USD)
Year 1945–1960 1961–1975 1976–1990 1991–1999 Total
Grants 3045.6 1999.0 750.4 1202.5 6997.5
(98.3%) (50.7%) (21.4%) (54.0%) (54.8%)
Loans 52.3 1942.0 2760.4 1023.7 5778.8
(1.7%) (49.3%) (78.6%) (46.0%) (45.2%)
Total ODA 3097.9 (100%) 3941.0 (100%) 3510.8 (100%) 2226.2 (100%) 12 776.3 (100%)
Source: MOFAT (2008).
5Other Non-DAC OECD member countries are Iceland, Mexico, Turkey, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and
Slovakia Republic.
6For details, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2008).
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Currently, Korea’s ODA is largely divided into concessional loans and grants: the former
executed through the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) by the Korea
Export Import Bank (Eximbank), and the latter mainly by the Korea International Coop-
eration Agency (KOICA).
EDCF was set up in the Eximbank under the authority of the Ministry of Strategy and
Finance in 1987 to help developing countries spur economic development through a form
of concessional loans. The fund was raised with an initial contribution of 13 million USD
from the government to be used as a conduit for establishing favourable economic relations
between Korea and other countries. As on 31 December 2008, the EDCF had raised a total
of 2005 million USD in capital, for a cumulative loan commitment of 4140 million USD,
while its disbursements from those funds stood at 1748 million USD.7
KOICAwas founded in 1991 with the principal objective of managing the disbursement
of grant aid and technical cooperation under the authority of theMinistry of Foreign Affairs
and Trade. KOICA’s annual disbursements amounted to a total of 271 million USD in 2007
through 28 representative ofﬁces in 27 countries. Its main modalities are projects, training
programmes and overseas volunteer programmes; major priority sectors include education,
health, governance, ICT, rural development and environment.
In 2008, Korea’s total ODA comprising soft loans (EDCF) and grants (KOICA and
others) increased by 15.3 per cent and reached 802.3 million USD from 696.1 million USD
in 2007 (see Table 2). In December 2009, it was announced by the Prime Minister’s ofﬁce
that Korea’s ODAwould increase to about 1.1 billion USD amounting to 0.13 per cent of
the GDP in 2010 (People’s Daily, 2009, dated 18 December). These ﬁgures are signiﬁcant
since in absolute terms, it exceeds the ODA volume of four DAC member countries—
Greece, Luxembourg, New Zealand and Portugal.
Since 2006 when the government of Korea announced its plans to join the OECD
DAC, Korea’s ODA has been undergoing major reforms. First of all, a comprehensive
ODA bill was passed in the National Assembly towards the end of 2009 for the purpose
of establishing a legal and institutional framework to guide and coordinate all ODA
activities (MOFAT, 2009). In addition to EDCF for concessional loans and KOICA for
grants, there are around 30 other government ministries or agencies involved in
execution of aid, which often causes inefﬁciency in aid execution.8 Secondly, despite
the economic downturn, the Korean government announced a decision to keep its
commitment to increase the ODA/GNI ratio to 0.15 per cent by 2012 and 0.25 per cent
by 2015 from the current 0.09 per cent (Ko and Lee, 2008). Thirdly, the government also
announced it would make efforts to improve aid planning, delivery and evaluation
capabilities based on DAC guidelines, thereby addressing issues explained in detail in
the next section.
3 MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF KOREA’S ODA
While Korea’s ODA has increased rapidly and will continue to do so in coming years, some
of its aid practices are problematic and are bound to raise criticism from civil society and
the international aid community. These are discussed in this section.
7For details, see Korea Eximbank (2009).
8Currently most of the line ministries, afﬁliated public institutions, and even some local governments are running
their own aid programs. See OECD (2008b) for details on fragmentation of Korea’s aid delivery system.
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3.1 Relatively Low ODA/GNI Ratio
Despite the rapid increase of ODA in recent years, the ODA/GNI ratio is among the lowest
for OECD members. Korea’s ODA disbursement reached 0.09 per cent of GNI in 2008
while the average for DAC members reached 0.31 per cent. Even compared with new
donors in non-DAC OECD members, Korea is still at the low end of the list as shown in
Table 3. Portugal, which is a DACmember with a similar level of GNI per capita to Korea’s
(USD 18,950), contributes about 0.27 per cent of its GNI to ODA, a ratio three times
greater than that of Korea.9
3.2 High Percentage of Concessional Loans
Korea’s grant ratio (the portion of grant aid out of the total bilateral aid) was 63.7 per cent in
2008. Table 4 shows that this is lower than that of DAC members (87.5 per cent). Of all the
DACmembers, only Japan and Portugal have a lower grant ratio than Korea (52.8 and 62.5
per cent, respectively). Canada, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand and Greece all provide
100 per cent of aid on a grant basis.
Despite international efforts to lower debt burdens of the least developed countries
(LDCs), Korea provided new concessional loans to LDCs especially in 2005 and 2006.
Korea’s preference for loans over grants can be attributed to the historical experience of its
Table 3. Net Ofﬁcial Development Assistance of Non-DAC OECD donors in 2008
Country ODA (Million USD) ODA/GNI Ratio (%)
Iceland 48 0.47
Slovakia Rep. 92 0.10
Hungary 107 0.08
Czech Rep. 249 0.12
Poland 372 0.08
Turkey 780 0.11
Korea 802 0.09
Source: International Development Statistics Online DB (OECD).
Table 2. Korea’s net ODA disbursements (2001–2008)
ODA assistance per year (million USD)
Categories 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total ODA 264.7 278.8 365.9 423.3 752.3 455.3 696.1 802.3
I. Bilateral 174.5 206.8 245.2 330.8 463.3 376.1 490.5 539.2
I.1 Grant 53.0 66.7 145.5 212.1 318.0 259.0 358.3 368.7
I.2 Loans 118.6 140.1 99.7 118.7 145.3 117.1 132.2 170.6
II. Multilateral 93.1 72.0 120.7 82.6 289.0 79.2 205.6 263.1
ODA/GNI 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.09
Source: International Development Statistics Online DB (OECD), Korea Eximbank.
9For the ODA/GNI ratios for OECD member countries, refer to OECD (2009).
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successful leveraging of concessional loans and to perceptions that loans will lead to
greater ﬁscal prudence than grants.10 However this was a concern raised by the OECD peer
review team in 2008: ‘in 2006, loans made up 60 per cent of Korean bilateral aid to LDCs
and grants 40 per cent, whereas the ﬁgure for lower middle income countries (LMICs) is 26
per cent loans and 74 per cent grants, and upper middle income countries (UMICs) received
only grants’ (OECD, 2008b, p. 14). In fact, for Korea, the poorer the recipient country is,
the higher is the tendency to use concessional loans. This is the opposite of what is
expected.
3.3 High Proportion of Tied Aid
In recent years, the OECD has been trying to reduce the percentage of tied assistance
among its members to enhance recipient ownership as well as effectiveness and efﬁciency
of aid. Especially for LDCs, the DAC has recommended a strong commitment to untying
through Recommendation on Untying Ofﬁcial Development Assistance to the Least
Developed Countries which entered into force on the 1st January 2002 (OECD, 2008c).
Although the portion of untied aid is increasing, it is still much lower than that of most
DAC countries (Table 5). A high proportion of tied aid is criticised as not only being likely
to reduce aid value and effectiveness but also the likelihood of neglecting the ownership of
recipients and inadvertently promoting donor-side interests. Japan on the other hand
Table 4. Grants as a percentage of Bilateral ODA, Korea and DAC members
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Overall
Korea 29.3 30.5 56.2 61.0 65.9 64.5 68.2 63.7
DAC 81.5 83.4 84.7 86.0 90.0 89.8 88.3 87.5
To LDCs
Korea 80.4 39.2 60.5 50.4 33.7 39.3 52.4 61.5
DAC 96.7 97.1 94.7 93.6 96.2 98.2 98.4 98.1
Note: Gross disbursement basis.
Source: International Development Statistics Online DB (OECD).
Table 5. Untied aid as a percentage of bilateral aid
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
DAC Total 79.9 85.3 91.8 91.3 92.3 89.0 84.6 87.3
UK 93.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Japan 81.8 82.8 96.1 94.4 89.7 95.6 95.1 96.5
Netherland 91.2 88.6 82.0 86.8 96.2 100.0 81.1 94.5
USA N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 63.5 68.5 75.0
Portugal 57.7 33.0 93.7 99.2 60.7 61.3 58.0 29.1
Greece 17.3 13.9 93.8 23.0 73.6 39.1 42.3 37.9
Korea 1.5 1.6 2.5 4.2 2.6 1.9 24.7 35.8
Source: OECD DAC Statistics.
10There is a debate comparing the development effectiveness of grants versus loans. See Klein and Harford (2005),
Sawada et al. (2004), Djankov et al. (2004), and Kawai and Takagi (2001) for details.
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justiﬁes the use of tied aid on historical grounds. Japan’s tied aid is called ‘capital projects
funds’ and its primary objective was to subsidise Third World purchasers of Japanese
exports. The tied aid was especially prevalent in the early 1990s when Japan and the United
States were engaged in ﬁerce competition over export markets. In the mid 1980s, the US
Congress had created a USD$ 300 million ‘war chest’ that could be used by the US Export-
Import Bank to initiate tied aid offers (Evans and Oye, 2002).
Irrespective of the veracity of contrasting assertions on the need to tie or untie aid, the
DAC has been moving towards greater untying of aid and Korea will need to untie more
rapidly than other countries to keep par with untying efforts.
3.4 Regional Bias in ODA
Although the share of assistance to Asia had gradually declined from 72.6 per cent in 2001
to 52.2 per cent in 2008, Korea still allocated a relatively large amount of its ODA to Asian
countries as Table 6 shows. ODA to Africa has been increasing rapidly to account for 19.3
per cent of the total ODA in 2008 from 2.6 per cent of the total in 2001. It is expected to
increase further, as in November 2009 President Myung Bak Lee announced a doubling of
aid to Africa by 2012 to reﬂect Africa being the geographical region most in need of
development assistance, and Korea’s increasing responsibility as a DAC member (Korea
Times, 2009, dated 23 November).
Looking at the country level, assistance is concentrated on only a handful of countries,
which are directly bound up with Korea in political and economic terms (Table 7). This is
why the big recipients in Asia—Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Philippines—are relatively
wealthier countries where Korea’s business interests are comparatively greater than poorer
countries. While this may also be true for other major donors, such as the European
Commission, the mismatch of development demand and supply still needs to be addressed
in future aid policies of Korea.
Just as the Asian bound ODA is targeted at those countries with greater economic
opportunities, ODA to Africa is concentrated on oil producing North African and Sub-
Saharan countries such as Angola, Egypt, Morocco and Algeria (OECD, 2008b). This
allocation of Korea’s ODA questions its level of commitment to poverty alleviation.
3.5 Large Number of Recipients
Despite a relatively small volume of bilateral ODAwith 539 million USD, Korea provides
aid to 114 countries (Table 8). Traditional donors such as US, Germany, France, UK, Japan
Table 6. Regional distribution of Korea’s ODA (2001–2008) (% of total net ODA)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Asia 72.6 78.3 78.5 78.2 80.9 60.5 61.2 52.2
Africa 2.6 2.7 7.7 8.5 8.4 12.7 14.3 19.3
Latin America 8.1 4.3 4.6 4.5 4.3 6.9 11.2 12.7
Eastern Europe 8.0 9.2 1.2 2.1 0.7 8.3 3.4 2.4
Oceania 2.4 0.6 2.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.4
Unspeciﬁed 6.4 5.0 6.0 6.5 5.5 11.3 9.2 13.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: OECD DAC Statistics.
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Table 7. Korea’s Top 10 partner countries in ODA (2006–2008)
Country 3yr Avg net
ODA (mn USD)
% of Total
bilateral aid
GNI per capita
(US $, Atlas)
UN country
classiﬁcation
Iraq 40.2 8.5 N/A Lower middle income
Viet Nam 29.3 6.2 790 Low income
Cambodia 27.9 5.9 540 LDC
Sri Lanka 25.4 5.4 1540 Lower middle income
Indonesia 22.2 4.7 1650 Lower middle income
Philippines 18.8 4.0 1620 Lower middle income
Angola 17.8 3.8 2540 Lower middle income
Laos 14.3 3.0 630 LDC
Bangladesh 13.4 2.8 470 Low income
Mongolia 11.6 2.4 1290 Lower middle income
Top 10 221.0 46.7
Other Countries 200.0 42.2
Non classiﬁed 52.5 11.1
Total 473.5 100.0
Source: OECD/DAC, Korea Eximbank, World Bank.
Table 8. Average ODA volume per recipient by donor (2008)
Countries Net bilateral
ODA (mn USD)
No. of
recipients
Avg ODA volume per
recipient (mn USD)
% of recipients
below ODA volume
of 1mn USD (%)
DAC
United States 23 859 139 129.8 15.1
Germany 9063 137 65.6 19.7
France 6461 139 46.6 16.5
United Kingdom 7367 130 44.3 32.3
Japan 6823 145 86.2 11.7
The Netherlands 5200 96 24.8 29.2
Spain 4802 116 30.2 19.0
Sweden 3142 111 14.5 30.6
Canada 3357 142 15.3 40.8
Italy 1838 122 15.6 29.5
Norway 3036 110 15.5 28.2
Australia 2653 75 25.9 40.0
Denmark 1828 89 15.9 32.6
Belgium 1376 105 9.4 35.2
Austria 1234 115 9.7 56.5
Switzerland 1550 110 7.1 28.2
Ireland 931 97 7.1 48.5
Finland 693 111 3.8 56.8
Greece 312 107 2.0 74.8
Portugal 373 52 6.7 69.2
Luxembourg 279 83 2.9 59.0
New Zealand 278 83 2.3 63.9
DAC Average 3930 110 26.4 38.1
Non-DAC
Turkey 736 118 5.9 67.8
Korea 539 114 4.3 48.2
Source: Author’s calculation based on OECD DAC Statistics.
Using gross ODA data excluding regional and non-classiﬁed recipients.
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and Canada provide assistance to a relatively larger number of countries with a signi-
ﬁcantly higher volume per recipient. On average, DAC members provide assistance to 110
countries with the average ODA volume of 26.4 million USD per recipient. Korea’s ODA
volume per recipient is 4.3 million USD, which is less than one-sixth of DAC’s average.
Compared with Turkey, a large non-DAC OECD donor, Korea deals with a similar number
of countries with a smaller amount of money. While Turkey spent 736 million USD for
bilateral ODA on 118 countries with average ODAvolume of 5.9 million USD per recipient
in 2008, Korea disbursed 539 million USD on 114 countries.
The large number of recipients for Korea’s ODA leads to less assistance per country,
which in turn affects the overall effectiveness of aid. While the percentage of the countries
receiving less than 1 million USD is 48.2 per cent for Korea, it is 38.1 per cent for DAC
countries. The more recipient countries, the larger the transaction costs. By concentrating
on fewer recipients, Korea would have a higher chance of making a meaningful impact on
the selected countries.11
4 DILEMMAS FACING KOREA
The characteristics of Korea’s ODAmentioned in the previous section have been discussed
among policy makers in the government, politicians in the National Assembly, prac-
titioners of NGOs and academics, and some of them are now being addressed by policy
makers to reﬂect DAC requirements. The government has committed itself to increasing
the volume of ODA, and is reviewing the current aid policies and delivery mechanisms.
However, consensus has not yet been achieved. This section considers why.
4.1 The Objective of Aid: Humanitarianism or National Interest
Though outstanding in its rapid economic development, Korea is still struggling to become a
strong global player in the economic sense like Japan. Thus while Korean policy makers
appreciate the need for pursuing humanitarian objectives in ODA disbursement, competition
in global business and energy security in recent years has driven Korea to seek ways of
furthering its national interests through aid.12 Furthermore, Korea’s dependence on the US for
security issues (e.g. threats fromNorth Korea) also puts strong coalition with the United States
before other considerations. For this reason, there was a signiﬁcant increase in reconstruction
relief for Afghanistan and Iraq during the last few years. As such, national interest is given a
priority when aid destinations are selected and the aid modality is designed.
The rise of China as a powerful player in gaining access to energy and resources is a key
factor in reinforcing the use of aid for commercial interest in Korea. China’s growing
ability to affect the actions of state actors largely stems from its role as a major provider of
11The Korean government recently announced it would reduce the number of major recipients to seventeen
countries. Yet, this seems to be a very difﬁcult task as there are many stakeholders (e.g., MOFAT, foreign
embassies, other ministries, KOTRA (Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency), industry and business
communities), all of which have vested interests in many developing countries and often demand ODA money.
This is another reason for the need to integrate the current dual system (Eximbank for loans and KOICA for grants)
into a single ODA executing body, like UK’s DFID.
12In a recent speech by a high rank ofﬁcer from KOICA that all three authors attended, he stressed that Korea’s
ODA is executed on nothing other than humanitarian grounds. While respecting his view, the authors also think
that his emphasis on humanitarian aid reﬂects the division of opinion among government agencies regarding the
objective of ODA in Korea.
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foreign aid, trade and investment (Lum et al., 2008). Since 2000, China has been using
aid as a tool for soft power, or inﬂuence through persuasion rather than coercion
(Kurlantzick, 2006). Another possibility is that China uses its aid as a lever through which
to establish its telecommunication technologies as standards in Africa (Lee, 2009). As is
well known from the dominance of Microsoft’s Windows as a standard operation system
and thereby its huge success, competition in ICT sectors is often competition for
establishing a ﬁrm’s or a nation’s own technology as a global standard. Infrastructure built
by China’s aid money is related to telecommunications. Once Chinese infrastructure is laid
and Chinese equipment is loaded on it, it is a matter of time before Chinese standards are
also adopted by recipients.
At a time when China’s aid to almost all regions is growing rapidly, some countries in
competition with China feel pressured to counter China’s offensive. The Korean gover-
nment has even coined an unambiguous expression (‘resource diplomacy’) to engage in
resource competition in Africa, and other places like CIS countries. Korea is under
domestic pressure to use aid more ‘strategically’ to achieve as much inﬂuence as it can in
gaining access to resources, energy, trade and investment deals. Considering Japan’s
experience, the pressure to use ODA more strategically increases when there is an
economic hardship at home or ﬁerce competition abroad. 13 For Korea, this explains why a
larger amount of aid does not go to the poorest countries, but to relatively rich oil-
producing countries, for example, with which a quid pro quo deal is more likely.
4.2 Development Assistance for North Korea
Assistance towards North Korea is another tricky issue for Korea. Currently Korea’s
constitution recognises its territory as ‘the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands’ which
includes North Korea, and thus any economic or humanitarian assistance towards North
Korea is not ofﬁcially recorded as ODA nor reported to the DAC.
It is estimated that the volume of Korea’s assistance to the North that could be counted as
ODA was 558 million USD in 2007 (OECD, 2008b). According to a letter sent from the
Korean government to the DAC Chair on 17 July 2008, the total of 558 million USD
delivered to North Korea consists of: project aid (123 million USD), technical co-operation
(5 million USD), developmental food aid (131 million USD), humanitarian aid (70 million
USD), administrative costs (2 million USD) and loans by the government (227 million
USD).14When assistance to North Korea is included in ofﬁcial ODA statistics for 2007, the
ODA/GNI ratio becomes 0.13 per cent instead of 0.07 per cent.
There has been a great deal of criticism by the current administration of the two previous
administrations’ humanitarian aid to North Korea, to the effect that much of the assistance
might have been used for other purposes (Lumsdain and Schopf, 2007). However, despite
the recent gridlock between the two Koreas due to the tensions over nuclear testings and a
series of missile launches by the North, any sudden change in the political stability of the
North could ease the tension between the two. This could result in signiﬁcantly increased
ﬂows of economic and social development ﬁnance from South to North. In this scenario,
the Korean government will ﬁnd it very challenging also to keep its commitments to
substantially increase ODA for other developing countries too.
13To see the global and domestic pressures that fomented the change in the ODA policy of Japan in early 2000s,
refer to Sunaga (2004) and Kawai and Takagi (2001).
14See OECD (2008b) for details.
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4.3 Balance Between Harmonisation and Differentiation
Every donor country wants visibility. This largely comes from a domestic public demand to
‘ﬂy the ﬂag’ or ‘show face’ through its aid assistance (Kawai and Takagi, 2001). There are
currently over 30 donors per recipient country (UN Economic and Social Council, 2007),
which leads to strong competition among donors for recognition. However, international
guidelines for aid effectiveness, such as the Paris Declaration (PD) and Accra Agenda for
Action (AAA), recommend stronger coordination between donors and the use of multi-
lateral approaches. Therefore, it is a key concern particularly for all new donors to achieve
visibility in an increasingly harmonised system (Manning, 2006).
A ﬁeld study in Guatemala by the authors to assess the overall effectiveness of KOICA’s
assistance programmes (KOICA, 2008b) conﬁrmed strong competition among over 15
donor agencies for visibility and leadership in the donor harmonisation process. KOICA
was reluctant to participate in the round table of the donors in Guatemala because with its
small volume compared to that of other major players (like US, Japan and Spain) they
cannot make their voice heard.
From an emerging donor point of view, harmonisation is by no means an easy task. Park
(2009) argues that while the principles of PD/AAA are necessary and important, they are
too complicated and full of ambiguous jargon, involving too many transaction costs for
coordination, and they may not be ﬂexible enough to adjust to the needs and circumstances
of each individual recipient. Moreover, she argues that aid delivery effectiveness through a
highly institutionalised system may not necessarily guarantee development effectiveness.
Pooling of funds or use of multilateral approaches can also be difﬁcult to exercise due to
problems in acquiring political or public support at home. This was the case Japan
experienced in early 2000s when it tried to pool ODA funds together in a multilateral
arrangement which met strong opposition from the parliament (Kawai and Takagi, 2001).
Different nations may have different ideals which they may want to expand, spread and
share such as the US Transformational Development (USAID, 2006) that focuses on
change in governance and institutions, and Japan’s emphasis on the need to incorporate
‘broad-based economic growth and diversiﬁcation’ in Africa’s development cooperation
(Watanabe, 2008). Similarly, many emerging donors have experience as a recipient and
some of them believe that they have their own recipe for development, which may be
different from that of traditional donors. When they try to use their own recipe, the level of
conformity to the international guidelines in both delivery and contents of aid can be
lowered. This often causes conﬂicts as in the case of China where it has given a substantial
amount of ODA to rogue states in exchange for oil (Woods, 2008).
Koreans are also very keen to enhance visibility and be proud of their success story. They
want to expand its appeal by applying their own development experiences in the past to
their current aid programme to developing countries. They believe that in this way Korea
can make a unique contribution. Therefore Korea’s ODA distributions are partly hinged on
its perceived core strengths and the aspiration to make its aid programmes distinctive,
based on Korea’s unique strengths. ‘We are currently working on creating a uniquely
Korean model for aid by focusing on sectors in which we have comparative advantages to
differentiate ourselves from other donor countries such as the OECD-Development
Assistance Committee’’ (MOFAT, 2007; second quoted from HIPC CBP, 2009).
A possible option for this unique contribution is a growth-based development framework
that borrows from Korea’s own economic development model. Current MDG and poverty
reduction strategy paper (PRSP) based development frameworks are known to be
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concentrated on achieving BHNs (Basic Human Needs) and enhancing access to public
services such as education and medical services, while pursuing a ‘broad-based’ and ‘pro-
poor’ growth using participatory processes. On the other hand, the Korean development
model prioritises economic growth over social welfare in its early stages, and is based on
the ‘selection and concentration’’ principle, with a centralised decision making process to
ensure efﬁciency.
The ‘Knowledge Sharing Program’ is a good example of using its unique development
experience. It is designed to assist developing partner countries in the area of economic
policy formulation and implementation based on Korean development model.15 The
‘Saemaul Undong (New Village Movement)’ is another example.16 It is a national rural
development programme in the 1970s and 1980s which was very successful in increasing
agricultural productivity and thus reducing the income gap between urban and rural areas.
It has already been benchmarked by many developing countries such as Mongolia,
Vietnam and even Congo (Korea Times, 2010, dated 16th April). However, this approach
bears a risk of ‘self-centeredness’ from over-conﬁdence in Korea’s own success (Chung,
2009), and it can be received as arrogance unless carefully executed.
5 CONCLUSION
In spite of more than two decades as a donor country, Korea’s ODA framework is still under
construction and characterised as lingering between pursuit of national interests and
observance of global standards represented by DAC’s guidelines. This instability has
resulted in a high percentage of concessional loans, a high proportion of tied aid and
regional bias. Having joined the DAC, a tenacious need to pursue unilateral national
interests will exacerbate difﬁculties in harmonising Korea’s ODA framework to that of the
DAC. To solve these problems, Korea needs to deﬁne a clear philosophy for its ODA. Such
a philosophy should consistently embrace harmonisation while at the same time ratio-
nalising the need for ‘independence’ as a new donor. This philosophy should hinge on three
major policy principles.
First, as recommended and emphasised by the international aid community, Korea’s
ODA operations should focus extensively on poverty reduction and sustainable deve-
lopment. In addition, to keep up with the current trend in the international development
cooperation, Korea should also pay more attention to ﬁghting against poverty and disease
in the LDCs, especially in Africa. While it is understandable for Korea to try and attain
distinction in its ODA operations based on its comparative advantages coming from
successful experiences, for example, in economic development planning and rural deve-
lopment, actual programmes and ﬁnal objectives should be geared towards activities that
have optimal utility in alleviating poverty and achieving sustainable development.
Secondly, as a newmember of the DAC, Korea should play a more active role in bridging
policy and ideological divergences between traditional and new donors. While traditional
15Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) is a technical cooperation program initiated by the Korean government in
2004 to provide a comprehensive policy consultation to developing partners based on Korea’s unique economic
development experiences.
16Saemaul Undong is a national, political campaign implemented by the Korean government across 1970s aiming
at comprehensive development in rural areas through income growth, social/cultural reforms and spiritual
enlightenment. The foundation of Saemaul Undong is based upon the spirit of diligence, self-help and
cooperation, and it is aimed at the devotion towards national development through community movement.
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donors generally have relatively well established, more elaborate, harmonised aid frame-
works, their diagnostic understanding of the requisite action plans for long-term economic
growth and poverty reduction in developing countries may be limited. Emerging donors on
the other hand, due to their development efforts in an era of capital and trade liberalisation,
may have more relevant development experiences that could better inform developing
countries with regard to the management of industrial, trade and investment policies. For
instance, considering the prominent importance of trade policy in Korea’s development,
it is advisable that Korea urges a more balanced examination of the effects of trade
liberalisation on poverty reduction. Similarly, based on its development experience, Korea
can focus on emphasising a more robust incorporation of the growth agenda into
development. As often argued, traditional donors’ inordinate focus on social sectors tends
to elicit aid dependency since developing countries do not generate incomes necessary to
independently run the social programmes that aid supports.17 Thus, Korea could play a role
in bridging traditional and emerging donors’ sectoral priorities to encourage growth,
industrial innovation and job creation in developing countries while at the same time
urging for an improved global aid architecture incorporating developing countries’
agendas.
Finally, Korea’s pursuit of unilateral ‘strategic’ objectives should be balanced by
increased harmonisation both within Korea’s ODA institutions and with other donors.
Korea’s institutions for channelling ODA, such as KOICA, the Eximbank and respective
ministries, should harmonise their aid dispensation to ensure the unity of objective and
compatibility with the recipient country’s economic priorities. In addition to following the
DAC groups’ ODA framework in its operations, Korea will similarly have to learn to adapt
its interests within the OECD DAC group’s objectives.
Despite the recent surge of research in emerging donors such as China, there is little
research on Korea as a donor. Considering the increasing size of Korea’s ODA activities
and its signiﬁcance, further research is required, for example, in relation to each challenge
discussed in this paper. This paper relies mainly on secondary materials and further
research to explore the views of the participants (e.g. policy makers, project managers in
KOICA, NGO activists, counterparts in the recipient countries) is required. It would be
particularly valuable to investigate whether recipient countries perceive any signiﬁcant
differences between Korea’s aid programmes and those of traditional donors. Future
studies should incorporate observations on what changes emerging donors are bringing to
the aid architecture established by the traditional donors.
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